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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the War Crimes Trials conducted in Nuremberg,
Germany during the period 1945 to 1948.

It specifically analyzes the

crimes of conspiracy to commit aggression and crimes against peace.
It interprets the indictments, proceedings, and judgments of the
International Military Tribunal from the perspective of natural law,
that is the innate moral feeling or inherent sense of right and wrong
held to characterize mankind.
The thesis also examines the German "guestion," again in terms of
the international morality manifested at Nuremberg.

Particular empha

sis is placed on the opposing concepts of loyalty to one's nation and
one's duty to humanity.

The sense of loyalty and the feeling of devo

tion of the German Officer Corps and the German people to Hitler and
National Socialism are analyzed— and judged— also in terms of natural
law.
Finally, criticisms of the Trials are examined and ultimately
regarded as secondary to Nuremberg's primary importance as a statement
regarding the primacy of man's moral obligation to humanity.

The

statement of natural law made at Nuremberg transcends the legal, pol
itical, and historiographical criticisms of the Trials.

Only in terms

of natural law are the verdicts rendered at Nuremberg coherent., logical,
and honest.

INFRODUCTIOr

The verdict of Nuremberg, although harsh, was just.

In effect,

it found tne entire German nation guilty of crimes against peace,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

The presiding tribunal

reached this verdict through the prosecution, conviction, and execu
tion or extended incarceration of important political, military, and
economic leaders of the Third Reich; and, by extension, the verdict
confirmed these leaders as symbolic representatives of modern German
history and of the Germans themselves.

Although it is not stated in

the officially recorded verdicts, the logical conclusion that can be
derived from an examination of the transcripts is that the trials were
convened, conducted, and concluded on the premise that the German peo
ple were guilty of the outrage to civilization that occurred between
1939 and 1945.

They were guilty of having violated the precepts of

natural law.
Because natural law is nebulous and violations of it difficult to
prove, its application was disavowed during the trials in favor of
legal positivism.

Legal positivism, however.

• only a pretext, often

only thinly disguised, masking the real mot:v • ion for the trials.

This

motivation had been evident in the public pronouncements of
leaders r.

ng the war and it was manifest in the rhetoric o f the pro-

secution during the trials.

°ersons were to be indicted for havinq

jielated the precepts of natural low.

1

Crimes noainst peace. ' r inr-S
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against humanity, and war crimes are wrong; they are heinous and inex
cusable; and they cannot be tolerated by western civilization.

Those

guilty of such crimes must be punished.
Although the prosecution at Nuremberg disavowed the concert of
collective German guilt as being incompatible with the positivist law
employed in the trials, the judgment of Nuremberg becomes explicable,
indeed only becomes honest, when considered in terms of a people being
found guilty of disobeying natural law.

According to Webster's Third

International Dictionary, natural law is "a body of law derived from
nature and binding upon human societies in the absence of or in addi
tion to institutional law."

Natural law is "the body of r_les or cus

toms derived from the general development of mankind and essential to
the maintenance of human society."

Natural law is based on the prem

ise that mankind, through the use of "right reason," can distinguish
between right and wrong.

The conclusion that follows, and the one

guiding the proceedings at Nuremberg, is that because man knows right
from wrong, those Germans who committed acts they knew to be wrong,
that is violations of natural law, had to be punished.
Not all Germans, obviously, were indicted and pronounced guilty at
Nuremberg: but, symbolical!, at least, perhaps between 80 and 95 per
cent of them were.

This is the percentage of the German people who

during the 1930s not only were in accord with the policies of the Nazi
government but also ardently desired arid heartily appreciated the ac
complishments of the Third Reich.

These willing and eager supporters

of Hitler and his policies were the ones condemned bv the verdict of

3

Nuremberg.

Hitler did not coerce, deceive, nor betray this vast ma

jority of Germans.

Indeed, Hitler merely implemented policies he had

repeatedly spoken of and written about since at least 1920.

Con

spiracy to commit aggression and crimes against peace, which were tne
first two counts of the indictment at Nuremberg, were therefore charged
as much against the German nation itself as against the actual defen
dants .

That some men of honorable character were convicted and hanged,

as in the case of General Alfred Jodi (see chapter IV), was part of the
symbolic price Germany paid for her arrogance and disregard for natural
law in launching the Second World War.
To assert that Germany, and not specific German leaders, perpe
trated the foul deeds charged by the prosecution seems to fly in the
face of the Anglo-American legal concept to avoid assessing collective
guilt or punishment in favor of insisting on individual responsibility
for wrongdoing.

And yet the doctrine of individual responsibility as

grounded in positivist law could not be applied at Nuremberg because
to do so would lead to the inescapable conclusion that within the con
text of Nazi Germany (the Fuhrerprinzip) the trials and punishment of
Goering, Raeder, and others were a substitute for the conviction of
the man who was not there:

Adolph Hitler.

Enough evidence exists, in

deed far too much for the conscience of rational man, to support the
thesis that this man's will was supreme— the alpha and omega i.o author:tv— the very : --.oni fication of authoritarian dictatorship.
That the juounont of Nuremberg was not based on the doctrine of
persona] accountability was necessary for anofhei reason:

Hitler, bv

h

his words and actions (which were utterly compatible as to ultimate
ends), fairly represented the hopes, dreams, and desires of the vast
majority of the Germans.

Hitler the politician actually carried out

his campaign promises, as it were, and thus sought to fulfill the man
dates he received directly from Germans in numerous elections and
plebiscites.
Although the precepts of natural law were everywhere evident at
Nuremberg, specific violations of natural law were certainly not the
counts on which Goering and others were indicted and convicted.

The

four counts on which defendants could be charged at Nuremberg were:
conspiracy to wage aggressive war, crimes against peace, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity.

This thesis will examine the first two

categories, that is, conspiracy to wage aggressive war and crimes
against peace, because they are the charges most amenable to the ap
plication of natural law.

They were also the counts the American and

British prosecution regarded as most crucial to establish and at the
same time those least likely to be influenced by emotionally charged
evidence (the Holocaust and the concentration camps).

Unfortunately,

because natural law was not openly offered into service at Nuremberg,
these were also the counts most susceptible to the criticism that the
prosecution were hypocrites bent on wreaking vengeance by imposing a
victor's justice.

\

CHAPTER 1

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND THE NATURAL LAW INDICTMENT

The designation "Nuremberg War Crimes Trials" is actually a col
lective term used to refer to several trials conducted in Nuremberg
over a period of years from 1945 to 1948.

The initial trial, and the

one which set the most precedents, was the Trial of the Major War
Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (hereafter refer
red to as the IMT) which convened in November, 1945.

The Charter of

the IMT was part of an executive agreement concluded by the four major
Allied Powers on rugust 8, 1945 in London which provided for the es
tablishment of an "International Military Tribunal to try war crimi
nals whose offences have no particular geographical location."^
A number of circumstances dictated that the IMT begin the trial
as soon after the cessation of hostilities as possible.

That the ac

cused have the right to a prompt trial was given some consideration.
Even more important, however, was the practical need of obtaining
testimony before the memories of witnesses and defendants were dis
torted by time or changed political and social circum'- ar.ces.

Also

prominent was the fanciful notion that by identifying and punishing
war criminals the vast human anH material cost of the Second World War1

1Robert K. Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in Internationa1_iaw
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inn.. !95.v), o. >.
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could somehow he made explicable tc a still-shocked and grieving world.
In the months following the surrender of the German military forces,
the American prosecutors obtained and examined a prodigious quantity of
documents and from them selected those that would be used in prosecuting
the case of conspiracy to commit aggression.

2

Because many of the doc

uments selected dealt with the wehrmacht and the conferences between
the Fuhrer and the military, it was inevitable that in the course of
the trial the specter of German militarism would be exhaustively ex
amined."5
Selected for his study on the feasibility of conducting a major
war crimes trial, Robert H. Jackson was the chief American prosecutor
at the IMT.^

In his opening statement for the prosecution on November

21, 1945, Jackson not only addressed the Tribunal, he also spoke to
the critics of the trial, to world opinion, and to history.

This

lengthy statement, consuming both the morning and afternoon sessions,*
3
O
Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of
Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 10 Vols. (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), l:iv. Literally tons of
documents were obtained by United States forces in May, 1945. Of over
100,000 documents individually examined, some 4,000 were selected to
be offered into evidence at the IMT.
30f the nineteen individual convicted by the IMT, five were
officers of the armed forces: i rmann Goering, Wilhelm Keitel, Karl
Doenitz, Erich Raeder, and Alfred Jodi.
^Robert H. Jackson, The Ni"” '~ ^rg Case, (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1947). Jackson, as Chief of Counsel for the United States in
prosecuting the principal Axis War Criminals, submitted a report to
President Truman on June 7, 1945. According to Jackson, "This [re
port] was widely published in Europe and, because of the President's
approval, became a sort of bench mark by which all subsequent propos
als were surveyed." pp. v-vi.

/

was couched in the rhetoric of natural law and determined the tone of
the trials.

Jackson began by noting that "the wrongs which we seek to

condemn ano punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devas
tating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because
it cannot survive their being repeated."56 And, he declared:
What makes this inquest significant is that these prison
ers represent sinister influences that will .lurk in the world
long after their bodies have returned to dust. We will show
them to be living symbols of racial hatreds, of terrorism
and violence, and of the arrogance and cruelty of power.
They are symbols of fierce nationalisms and of militarism,
nf intrigue and war-making which have embroiled Europe gen
eration after generation, crushing its^manhood, destroying
its homes, and impoverishing its life.
Jackson continued this tone throughout his address.

He emphasized

the immorality of Germany's actions when she violated the KelloggBriand Pact:

"These defendants did make aggressive war, a war in vio

lation of treaties.

They did attack and invade their neighbors in

order to effectuate a foreign policy which they knew could not be ac
complished by measures short of war."7

According to Jackson, the trial

represented mankind's desperate effort "to apply the discipline of
the law to statesmen who have used their powers of state to attack the
foundations of the world's peace and to commit aggressions against the
rights of their neigi'bors."

8

Jackson saw the IMT as the delayed en-

5International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals
Before the International Military Tribunal, >\2 vols. (Nuremberg,
Germany, 1947), 2:98-99.
6Ibid., p. 99.
'ibid., p. 149.
Ibid., p. 194.

8

forcement mechanism of the Treaty of Paris:

"This Charter and this

Trial, implementing the Kellogg-Brjand Pact," he declared, constituted
"juridical action of a kind to ensure that those who start a war will
g
pay for it personally."
Jackson eloquently concluded his remarks to the Tribunal by of firming that "the real complaining party at your bar is Civilization.
In all our countries it is still a struggling and imperfect thing."'*'0
He then powerfully summarized the case for civilization:
It does not plead that the United rtates, or any other
country, has been blameless of the conditions which made the
German people easy victims to the blandishments and intimi
dations of the Nazi conspirators.
But it points to the dreadful sequence of aggressions and
crimes I have recited, it points to the weariness of flesh,
the exhaustion of resources, and the destruction of all that
was beautiful or useful in so much of the world, and to
greater potentialities for destruction in the days to come.
It is not necessary among the ruins of this ancient and
beautiful city with untold members of its civilian inhab
itants still buried in its rubble, to argue the proposition
that to start or wage an aggressive war has the moral qual
ities of the worst of crimes. The refuge of the defendants
can be only their hope that international law will lag so far
behind the moral sense of mankind that conduct which is crime
in the moral sense must be regarded as innocent in law.
Civilization asks whether law is so laggard as to be ut
terly helpless to deal with crimes of this magnitude bv
criminals of this order of importance. It does expect that
your juridical action will put the forces of international
law, its precepts, its prohibitions and, most of all, its
sanctions, on the side of peace, so that men and women of
good will, in all countries, may
"leave to live by no
man's leave, underneath the law."x

^Ibid., p. 154.

11Ibid., n.

.

9

Jackson's remarks thus ^eveal that although natural law wa'. dis
avowed during the trials in favor of legal positivism, it was none
theless being invoked from the outset.

The tone of Jackson's address

was that mankind is characterized as having an innate moral feeling
or inherent sense of right and wrong.

And although he tried to make

clear that there was no intention "to incriminate the whole German
people," in the end they were, because of the far-reaching implications of the appeal to natural law.

12

Jackson had stated well the tasks facing the prosecution, but
disagreements arose among members of the United States prosecuting
staff over the best method of presenting its case.

One view favored

having witnesses confront the accused in the courtroom in order to
assure heightened public interest in the trials and to secure better
news coverage.

Jackson, however, favored placing almost exclusive

reliance on captured documents and his was the view that prevailed.
The prosecution's case on the count of conspiracy to commit aggression
was based almost entirely on documents that were authentic and, with
two exceptions, unchallenged.

Keeping in mind the criticisms of the

trial proceedings and the importance to history of the Tribunal,
Jackson deluded the procedure:
This reliance chiefly on documents admittedly made a drab
case from a news point of view and a difficult one to report.
Howeve-, the disinterestedness and unquestioned authenticity
of documents settle doubts which always would linger if the
same story were told by witnesses, the best of whom always
are open to suspicion of bias, bad memory, ana influence.

''ibid., p. 102.

10

While no doubt we sacrificed s o t ^thing of contemporary in
terest, I am confident that the strategy laid ? more solid
foundation for the case in history, particular1/ and impor
tantly in German history.
Although the veracity of the documents used could not be impugned,
critics raised both legal and historical objections to the Nuremberg
Trials.

On what basis could they be justified?

be distinguished from vengeance?

How could justice

What transcendent obligation could

possibly override legal precendents ann historic experience?

Respond

ing to these criticisms and others, the IMT, through its transcripts
and recorded verdicts, conducted the proceedings at Nuremberg under
the assumption that the transcedent obligation was completely moral
in character:

the determination of -ight and wrong.

The obligation

was grounded in the definition of the word "natural" that forms part
of the term "natural law":

"the innate moral, feeling or inherent sense

of right and wrong held to characterize mankind."

The law to be ao-

piied at Nuremberg had to be natural law for the very reason that it
was necessary to invoke natural law in order to legitimize the viola
tions of positivist law.
An obvious difficulty with using natural law in international
tribunals, however, is that it is necessary to have a large group of
nations sitting as judges and invoking the law against the one nation
that is accused of being the lawbreaker.

At Nuremberg this difficult .<

was compounded because the victorious Allies sat in judgment ever a
dofooted Gcrmanv.

jackson. n.

It was impossible, therefore, co avoid the criti-

11

cism that natural law was being used to cloak what was really no more
than victors' justice.
An additional complication that arose from the use of natural law
was the reflexive reluctance of a lawyer to use law based upon an innate
moral feeling or an inherent sense of right and wrong.

These formu

lations, so jurists argue, are imprecise and open to subjective inter
pretation.

Robert N. Wilkin, in an article on the "Status of Natural

Law in American Jurisprudence," recalled that the opponents of natural
law objected to its use because it was impractical and idealistic.
Its aims and principles lend themselves to such reflective studies as
Ethics and Moral Philosophy, "but they have no place in the actual
administration of positive law."

14

...
Wilkin rejected these criticisms

because ten years of experience as a trial judge in a United States
District Court had convinced him that such assertions were not true.
In fact, he declared:
They are mere nonsense. The principles, standards, and
precepts of Natural Law are continually employed by courts
as the constitutions, statutes, and precedents are inter
preted and applied to the ever-changing circumstances of
life. They are employed also in the interpretation of wills,
contracts, conduct and relationships of life. They are part
of man's nature arid cannot be separated from his lifer.
Courts continually use such tests as, What is reasonable?
What is true? What is fair? What is just? They do not stop
to asK Pilate's question. They are not disturbed by the
intricate ratiocinations of the skeptics who think that a L

Robert N. Wilkin, "Status of Natural Law in American Juris
prudence," Uni versi ty of Notre Dame Nat o ralJ aw Inet j•ute : car ed
ed.. Alfred L. Scan]an (Notre Dame. Indiana:
"e 1 l e w ed \ aw
University of 'Totre Dame, 1?/jq ). , : 1 7.

o -.
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such concepts are merely subjective and actually unaj.^
tainable. Courts are not deterred by such conceits.
Critics also raised the objection that there was no precedent on
which to base the Nuremberg Trials.

They were right; there was none.

But, as Sheldon Glueck pointed out in his book on war criminals in
1944, all courts were at one time unprecedented.
demanded unprecedented action.

Moreover, the times

The atrocities committed by the Axis

powers, led by Germany, were unprecedented.

And, asked Glueck, "Can

history show a better age then our own for mankind to initiate a
series of much needed precedents?"^
Proponents of natural law based many of their ideas on the work
of Hugo Grotius, who was perhaps the most influential philosopher on
natural law.

According to this seventeenth-century jurist, the law

of nature has its source in the rational nature of man and the innate
human need for the maintenance of social order.

Cicero, the noted

Roman jurist, declared that natural law was coeval with the mind of
God.

Grotius, altnough very religious, believed that natural law

existed even if "we should concede . . . that there is no God."

17

Grotius believed that natural law principles could be applied to
international relations, a belief that was shared and applied by the
jurists at Nuremberg.

According to William J. Bosch, who wro o

15Ibid., p. 147.
l6Sheldon
ment (New York:

Glueck, War Criminals. Their Piosecution and PunishAlfred A. Knopf, 1944), pp. 119-20.

^^Hugo Grotius, Prolegomena to The Law of War and Peace, trans.
f rand'* W Kelsey (New York:
The Liberal Arts Press, 19V/T, p. vii.
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Judgment On Nuremberg, the application of natural law philosophy to in
ternational relations as enuciated by Grotius could be reduced to four
major principles:
First, Grotius would hold states to the same rules which
regulate the lives of individuals and make violation of them
a crime subject to punishment. Second, he formulated the
"law of peace" which became the foundation of the whole
system. Third, he argued that states may properly punish
other states which violate the law. Fourth, he accepted
natural law— or right reason— as the primary basj.g for de
termining rules for the right conduct of states.
Bosch contended that an examination of the Nuremberg trials on the
basis of these four principles would reveal that the trials were based
upon Grotius' natural law philosophy and exemplified its tenets.

19

Regarding the charges of aggression and crimes against peace,
which this thesis is addressing, Bosch declared:
That the German warlords had broken through the limits of
their legitimate sphere of activity was decided on the basis
of Grotius' second principle, the theory of "just" and "un
just" war, i.e., that belligerent action was justified only
when its cause was in conformity with right reason, the
natural law. Nuremberg (with an assist from the modern Am
erican idea that aggressive war was always wrong) declared
that Nazi aggression was morally evil and conseguently
criminal.
This natural-law verdict on aggressive war agrees with
the pragmatist's judgment that unjust war ’i" an evil which
was no longer tolerable. The Grotian, howevex, did not con
demn aggression because man's experience proved that it was
a socially undesirable act but because such hostilities
violated ultimate, eternal, and objective norms. Therefore
they were acts intrinsically evil, malum in se. Aggressive*
1P

William J. Bosch. Judgment on Nuremberg, (Chapel Mill, No
Gain1ina: The University of North Carolina '-'ress, 1970) p. AO.
19

Ibid., p. 60.

wars were declared "unnatural acts" devoid of right order
or finality.
Thus, according to those who with Grotius believed that "unnatural
acts" must be punished, Germany was convicted at Nuremberg of having
acted "unnaturally."

Germany had behaved immorally toward her neigh

bors and had not acted as a nation should in a state of nature.

Though

natural law, because it is based on an innate moral feeling and an
inherent sense of right and wrong, is subjective, its proponents at
Nuremberg aspired to achieve objectivity in the administration of the
law.

Bosch wrote of the need for a "norm for sanctions which could be

applied without bias or prejudice."

21

He expressed this ideal as

follows:
Grotius' final tenet stated that natural law was right
reason which determined rules for the proper conduct of
states. Because of the universal and absolute nature of
this norm, the proponent of natural law claimed that inter
national criminal law could be impartially administered.
The act of the accused nation was measured by the eternally
objective principles of the law of nature, and the verdict
finally arrived at expressed absolute justice. The objec
tive validity of the verdict was the ultimate refutation of
the positivist's charge that Nuremberg was "victors' ven
geance." “
Perhaps the clearest international expression of the belief that
agaression and crimes against peace are violations of natural law came
in 1928 with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris or, as it is more
commonly kno<»n,
20.. . .
ibid..

the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

p. 6 2 .

2 1 Ti • .
I b n . , 0.

63.

/ v I b i d . . DP . 6 J -6 *

s :oratories
rhe si
on..,to

this Pact
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proclaimed in Article 1 that they condemned "recourse to war for the
solution of international controversies," and they renounced war "as an
instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

23

Condemnation of war was reinforced in Article 2 in which the signatories
agreed that "the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts
of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise
among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."^/4
Unlike the Treaty of Versailles which, according to unrepentant
Germans had been forced on a prostrate and helpless Germany, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was willingly and voluntarily subscribed to by the
German government.

In fact, it was Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann's

signature that appeared first in the list of signatures.

It is an irony

that the very principles Stresemann stressed when summarizing the
reasons for Germany's support of the proposed Pact were those it was
later found guilty of having violated.

Stresemann's summary was con

tained in a note to the American Ambassador Michael Schurman on
April 27, 1928, from which the following exerpts were taken:
Germany has no higher interest than to see the possibility
of armed conflicts eliminated and a development assured in
the life of the nations which would guaranf.ee the peaceful
settlement of all international disputes. The conclusion of
a pact such as the United States now has in view would cei^
tainly bring the nations a good deal nearer to this goal.
73
‘ James Thayer Gerould. The Pact o t pa n s (New York:
Wilson Company, 1929), p. 18.
2<aibid., p. 18.
^ I b i d . , u. A8.

The

W.
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The German Government is also of the opinion that £ge ul
timate goal must be the universality of the new pact. '
The German Government . . . believes that the binding ob
ligation not to use war as an instrument of national policy
could only serve to strengthen the fundamental ideas of the
Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Rhine (Locarno)
pact.
. . . this new guarantee for the maintenance of peace must
give a real impulse to the efforts for the carrying out of
general disarmament. And further still, the renunciation of
war must as a necessary complement enlarge the possibilities
of settling in a peaceful way„the existing and potential con
flicts of national interests.
Several objections were raised to the Kellogg-Briand Pact that
significantly detracted from its credibility.

Paramount among these

objections was that the Pact did not have the force of law because it
lacked the sanctions necessary for enforcement.

Another objection was

that in permitting wars of self-defense, it left to the subjective
judgment of individual nations the decision on when war was necessary
for their defense.

Nevertheless, despite these objections, the Kellogg-

Briand Pact was a declaration of principle.

The signatory nations con

demned recourse to war as a means of settling international difficulties.
It was a principle grounded in natural law, that is in the innate moral
feeling or inherent sense of right and wrong held to characterize man
kind.

26Ibid., o. 50.
27Ibid., p. h9 .
yp
"Ibid., p. 50.

CHAPTER II

CRIMES AGAINST PEACE— THE LEGACY OE MILITARISM
By 1945 militarism in Germany was not so much a new phenomenon as
it was a part of an unwritten constitution or an article of national
faith.

It had been inferred, speculated upon, assumed, and witnessed

by European states and statesmen since the eighteenth century.

It fell

to the IMT and its successor trials to prove that this militarism was
a virulent disease that had to be methodically examined in the lab
oratory of world opinion and then thoroughly eradicated.

The IMT began

its proceedings, and conducted the prosecution throughout the trials,
under the tacit assumption that the goals of German nationalism as
manifested by the Wehrmacht, especially the Officer Corps, were closely
allied to the goals of the Nazi Party.

These goals were regarded by

the IMT as complementary to each other, if not completely identical.
In his book, The Guilt of the German Army, Mans Ernest fried made
the case for the natural alliance of the German Armv and the Nazi *-'a; tv
He contended that "the new German militarism 1* a symbiosis of a rone Ia
nature, oetween the Army and the National Socialist 'Si: tv for mat. Ic*
f ried proceeded to the view chat "National 'v- in! ism represent.-' r*'•••:or,:-*
German militarism, because National Sec in 1i

iLins Ernest fried, ihc Giid
arm 5 i’an Company ,
. is--[!•>i;J. , (. i•.

w.c •!"1"

•■■* ••• •*
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mechanism, adapted to an era of peace efforts and insecurity, for the re

establishment of the strength, the influence and the program of the German
generals.

With the appreciation of this point goes the understanding

that German fascism and militarism make up one and the same phenomenon."
fried asserted that:
German history between the two World Wars has largely been
the history of the execution of a great bargain. The Na
tional Socialist Workers Party was the agent which delivered
the German nation to the Army. Hitler expressed the deal in
these words: "The Party hands over the nation to thg Army;
and the nation hands over the soldiers to the Army."
Pried's account, written in 1942, was in error in regard to which group,
the Army or the Party, was most dominant in the coalition; yet his con
tention of a "symbiosis" between them was correct.
The issue et Nuremberg, especially in regard to the military de
fendants, involved the degree to which the military was master of its
own house.

Even the passionate and thoughtful German liberal Friedrich

Meinecke recognized and commented on the relationship between militarism
and the Nazi Movement.

He wrote:

"Yet one cannot be wholly happy in

centpmplating them [General Staff officers].

A full understanding of

the totality of historical existence was lacking in these technicians
of war.

Therefore they could commit fatal blunders in their estimation

of such matters as lay beyond the grasp of technical-military compre5
n,jns''on."
Meinecke recalled a remark by a Reichswehr colonel jn 1930.

;1\ '

, p. 6.

id., p. 7.
"’Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe, tranp. by Sidney B. •'a>
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ,l°SP: reprinted.. Post'cn: •■■‘eaeor
. J963), p. 42.
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When asked about the general attitude of the Reichswehr the colonel
replied "the Reichswehr will always stand where there are the strongest
national interests."6

This rationale, whether merely self-serving or an

honest expression of a sense of duty to Germany, pervaded the Officer Corps,
from the Reichswehr of General von Seeckt to the Wehrmacht of Hitler.
Yet the existence of a mutuality of interest, German nationalism,
does not constitute proof that the German Army formed a conspiracy with
Hitler to start aggressive war.

Sir John Wheeler-Bennett in his com

prehensive work, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 19181945, affirmed that the Army had lost the ability to influence events by
the time of the Austrian Anschluss in March, 1938.

The shake-up of the

General Staff and the senior field generals that occurred as a result of
the Blomberg-Fritsch affair the previous month demonstrated, according
to Wheeler-Bennett, the condition of impotence into which the Officer
Corps had fallen.

The beginning of the end of the independence of the

Army may be traced to the oath of personal fealty sworn by the Armed
Forces to Hitler on August 2, 1934 (after the death of President von
Hindenburg).

That oath, whose significance was immeasurable, was as

follows:
I swept before God to give my unconditional obedience to
Adolph hitler, Fuhrer of the Reich and of the German People,
Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, and I pledge my word as
a brave soldier to observe this oath always, even at peril
of my life .'

Ibid., 43.
7John
in -’clitic:

. Wheeler -Bennett. The Nemesis of Lower:_The German Army
1918-1945 (London: Macmillan .v Go. Ltd., 1964), o. 539.
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Wheeler-Bennett contended that "till August 1934 the Army could have
overthrown the Nazi regime at a nod from their commanders, for they
owed no allegiance to the Chancellor; but, with the acceptance of
Hitler's succession, the Generals had added one more fetter, perhaps
the strongest of all, to those psychological bonds which chained them
ever more inescapably to a regime which they had thought to exploit and
o
dominate."
The oath was a demonstration of the gratitude that the Armed Ser
vices felt toward Hitler because of the rearmament decree of March 16,
1934 and the elimination of the threat of the Sturm Abteilungen in the
Roehm purge in June.

If this form of payment for services rendered did

not constitute a conspiracy, then it surely demonstrated willing ac
ceptance on the part of the Officer Corps of the fait accompli of
hitler's supremacy within Germany.
A kind of collusion of quiet acquiescence began for the German
Army and the general population in the summer of 1934 which was to
last until the bitter end.

It really■seemed to be by a fortuitous

process that Hitler got results, obtained more power as a consequence
of the results obtained, and then proceeded to get more results, more
power, and on and on.

This reciprocal process is perhaps the source

of the satisfaction Milton Mayer referred to in They Thought They Were
Free when he wrote that most Germans wanted Nazism "or, under pressure of
combined reality and illusion, came to want it.

8Ibid., p. 339.

They wanted it; they
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got it; and they liked it."'

In this respect Justice Jackson was

wrong at Nuremberg when he gave as the reason for not indicting the
German people for crimes against peace and conspiracy to aggression
the existence of a totalitarian regime and a brutal police state.

The

ruthless Gestapo and all the insidious branches of Heinrich Himmler's
apparatus were not responsible for the loyalty the Germans felt toward
Hitler.

Germans were not coerced nor even beguiled down the road to

perdition; until at least 1942 they were quite pleased, even charmed,
and certainly impressed with the successes and accomplishments of
their Fuhrer.

It was their own successes, celebrated vicariously through

the medium of the leader of the Volk, that Germans could, and did,
admire.
The very diplomatic and military activities prior to September 1,
1939 which Germans admired were recalled by the prosecution at the IMT
in order to demonstrate active collusion and conspiracy on the part of
the defendants.
tinental Europe.

The legal concept of conspiracy war not in use in con
The charge of conspiracy to wage aggression was in

cluded in the indictment primarily at the instigation of the Americans.
Thus the prosecution and defense of this charge ac the IMT became a
unique experiment in international law.
The litany of alleged acts of aggression ircluded the following:
German withdrawal from the League of Nations, the remilitarization of
the Rhineland, German rearmanent, revocation of the Treaty of Versailles.
Q
"Milton Mayer, They Thought They Were r rec: ihe Germans 1933-43
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Rress, 1955), p. xix.
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the annexation of Austria, the occupation of the Sudetenland, and the
seizure of Bohemia and Moravia.

Additionally, the Reichwehr's activ

ities during the 1920s and 1930s in violation of the Treaty of Versailles
were offered as further proof of the German Army's propensity to prepare
for aggression.

That those events took place was never disputed at

Nuremberg, not even by the defense counsel.

But the crux of the con

troversy was whether these events constituted some sinister master plan—
a conspiracy to wage aggression.
The interpretation of these events was, like beauty, in the eye of
the beholder.

Some of these events were regarded within Germany as the

logical and inevitable fulfillment of German destimy.

The Anschluss

with Austria in 1938, for example, was called the "campaign of flowers"
because as the German soldiers marched into Austria they were "bombarded"
with flowers by the Austrians.

The Anschluss was almost unanimously

considered as the logical culmination of the Grossdeutsch solution to
German unification discussed since 1848.

All of these events were

lauded, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, as the just and manifest
expression of Germany's re-emergence as a great power and the end of her
status as the outcast of Europe.

If there was a conspiracy it was a

national conspiracy— a conspiracy participated in by the vast majority
of Germans.
Justice Jackson had hinted at the collective German spirit of ag
gression in,, his opening statement when he called the defendants "symbols
of fierce nationalisms and of militarism, of intrigue jnd war-makion . . . "

Chester Wilmot expressed the same sentiment:

"Having become
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involved through German aggression twice in one generation, the peoples
of Britain, America and Western Europe were resolved that Germany's
military power must oe broken forever and that her people must be made
to realize that 'aggression does not pay . ' " ^

The operative phrase is

that "her people must be made to realize" that militarism and aggression
are unacceptable.
In the course of their prosecution of the case of conspiracy to
aggression and crimes against peace, the ultimate manifestation of
militarism, the American prosecutors introduced into evidence at
Nuremberg numerous documents.

The purpose of the most significant of

these documents was to demonstrate that some of the defendants were
aware of Hitler's plans and ambitions involving aggression months, and
even years, before September 1, 1939.

Hitler had addressed the concept

of Lebensraum and the necessity for securing German autarky on Nov
ember 5, 1937 at the so-called Hossbach conference at which several of
the Nuremberg defendants were present.

Hitler began his remarks with

the statement that "the aim of German policy is the security and the
preservation of the nation, and its p r o p a g a t i o n . H e further contended
that this aim is "consequently, a problem of space."

12

The idea of obtaining additional living space, or Lebensraum, was
not a new nor revolutionary departure from what Hitler had been ad-

10Chester Wilmot, ihe Struggle for Europe (New York:
Books, 1963), p. 713.
^^Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression , 3:293-96.
^Ibid., p. 296.

Harper Colophon
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vocating for years.

It did not come as a surprise nor a great shock to

those present on November 5, 1937 that Hitler proposed to start doing
something about what he had been talking and writing about since 1920.
The British historian B. H. Liddell-Hart, commenting on the myopia of
European statesmen during the thirties, wrote:
Nothing may seem more strange to the future historian than
the way that the governments of the democracies failed to
anticipate the course which Hitler would pursue. For never
has a man of such immense ambition so clearly disclosed be
forehand both the general process and particular methods by
which he was seeking to fulfill it. Mein Kampf, together
with his speeches and other utterances, provided abundant
clues to his direction and sequence of action . ^
Although the governments of the democracies failed to anticipate
Hitler's course of action, one European statesman is often given credit
for perceiving the menace of Hitler and German aggression years in
advance of his peers.

Winston Churchill, as a politician with an ap

preciation of history, understood Hitler's problem and his mission.
Churchill recognized Hitler's geopolitical problem and feared the con
sequences of its resolution.

Some time later, Milton Mayer commented on

Germany's geographical problem by writing that "I am sorry to have to
say that Hitler was right.

Germany has more frontiers— and they are

'soft' frontiers— and more historically dissimilar neighbors than any
other nation on earth.
Churchill as a pre-eminent connoisseur of Realoolitik recognized
in Hitler a kindred spirit.
i3

Both men were aware that the two Ingredients

B. A. Liddell-Hart, Strateay (New vork:
(3945), p. 223.
^ M n y e r , p. 230.

Frederick A. Praeaer,

necessary for a second conflagration even more devastating than the Great
War were being combined in Germany in the 1930s.

The first ingredient

was the strength to launch a general European war; this Germany had or
was rapidly obtaining.

The second ingredient was the will to go to war;

this Hitler assuredly also possessed.

Military strength and personal

determination would not be enough, however.

No head of state would be

capable of sustaining a war without tne support of his nation.
seems, is what really alarmed Churchill*

This, it

that Hitler's will and the will

of the German people were in accord— they were one and the same.

So with

the strength and the will, above all the will, Germany was preparing
to go to war.

Such was Churchill's message to all who would listen.

But this was also the period of Churchill's "wilderness years" and, being
out of power, he was impotent to influence events.
The war of aggression that Churchill had prophesied became the
manifest crime against peace.
September 1, 1939.

It came with the invasion of Poland on

American prosecutors relied on Wehrmacht and Army

documents to prove that "Case White" had been in preparation since the
previous spring.

That the Second World War was started by Germany with

premeditation, or the more dramatic "malice aforethought," became
abundantly clear at the IMT.

On August 2?, 1939 Hitler delivered a

speech to his Commanders in Chief in which he said, "I have called you
together to give you a picture of the political situation, in order
that you may have insight into the individual elements on which J have
based my decision to act and in order to strengthen your confidence."1
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He continued by explaining his reasons for the imminent invasion in the
following words:
Tt was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come
sooner or later. I had already made this decision in [the]
spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West
in a few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the
seguence cannot be fixed. One cannot close one's eyes even
before a threatening situation. I wanted to establish an ac
ceptable relationship with Poland in order to fight first
against the West. But this plan, which was agreeable to me,
could not be executed, since essential points have changed.
It became clear to me, that Poland would attack to the sea.
The further development became obvious after the occupation
of the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under
[the] circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise r. an
inopportune moment.16
Hitler thus justified the forthcoming war in order to avoid Deing
taken advantage of at an "inopportune moment."

He further explained why

the timing and circumstances were favorable by mentioning his own role
in Germany:
Essentially it depends on me, my existence, because of my
political activities. Furthermore the face that probably no
one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German
people as I do. There will probably ne er again be a man in
the future with more authority than I have. My existence is
therefore a factor of great value.
Hitler envisioned himself as the tool, or embodiment, of Germany’s
will to realize her manifest destiny.

This dest .ny entailed obtaining

more living space for Germans and the achieve- ant of economic selfsufficiency.

Hitler's audience of military officers found this analysis

entirely accurate; another affirmation of the motto:
P.eich, Ein Fuhrer.

l6Ibid.. o. 581-82.
1 'ibid.. p. 582.

Ein Volk, Eir.
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Milton Mayer likened the German attitude toward aggression to a form
cF national self-defense:
What the rest of the world knows as German aggression the
Germans know as their struggle for liberation. And this lib
eration has no more to do with individual liberty than it has
in Polar;- or Abyssinia or South Korea— nothing whatever . . .
Every aggression is a defense— at worst, a premature defense—
including that of September 1, 1939. Were not the French and
the English, in July and August, making frantic overtures to
Moscow, to tighten the circle of Europe? Were they letting
their ideological differences with the Communists embarrass
them? Why should the Germans?^
For the Germans to embrace Realpolitik is the most natural thing in the
world; after all, the policies of Bismarck popularized the term.
An essential element of Realpolitik in the era of mass communi
cations involves public opinion; and Hitler, being a consummate poli
tician, understood its importance.
the First World War:

He had written regarding the start of

"The struggle of the year 1914 was not forced on

the masses— no, by the living God— it was desired by the whole people."

19

If Germans were more cynical, and hence less enthusiastic, about going
to war in 1939, they were at least as united as to war aims as they
were in 1914— and probably more so since the ideas of .living space and
autarky were more easily understood than the intricacies of the al
liance system or the imperatives of the Schlieffen Plan.

Also, the Nazi

regime had already demonstrated that it could net results in the economic
and diplomatic spheres much better and guicker than the Weimar Republic
had been able to.

Germans then began the Second World War confident in*
1

J8 M ayer, p. ?5 1 .

1Q
.
Adolf Hitler, quoted in The Or:pi ns ot 4 iranedy,
Williams, Jr. (St. Louis: forum Prose. l?Bi), o. 7.

Nimur’i

28

their government and united in purpose.
That the Germans had confidence in their government in 193S was
clear from the consistent policies that their government had oecn
pursuing during the inter-war years.

That these policies were popular

among the Germans is evident from the overwhelming majorities registered
in the plebiscites that ratified the remilitarization of the Rhineland
and the Anschluss with Austria.

There had also been a marked con

sistency in the strategic thinking of the military high command, es
pecially the Army General Staff.

The unique German brand of geopolitical

thinking which Western Europe and America interpret as militarism or
conspiracy to aggression was decidedly not invented by the Nazi regime.
In 1922 General von Seeckt produced such a geopolitical treatise for
limited (governmental) circulation.

He addressed the idea of the par

tition of Poland in concert with Russia thus:
With Poland we come now to the core of the Eastern problem.
The existence of Poland is intolerable and incompatible with
Germany's vital interests. She must disappear and will do so
thrc ',1 her own inner weakness and through Russia— with our
help. °oland is more intolerable for Russia than for our
selves; Russia can never tolerate Poland. With Poland col
lapses one of the strongest pillars of the Peace of Ver
sailles, France's advance post of power. The attainment of
this objective must be one of the firmest guiding principles
of German policy, as it is capable of achievement— but only
through Russia or with her h e l p . ^
Ge. man foreign policy objectives, at least in so far os the high
command level of the armed services was concerned, did not change from
1922 to 1939.

The partition of Poland with Russian collaboration en

visaged by von Seeckt occurred in September. 1939.
20 Wheeler -Bonnet

1S
‘'.

Even the Hossbarh

conference, which was given so much weight by the prosecution at the

?1
IMT, did not represent a radical departure in German policy."

Grand

Admiral Erich Raedtx, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, attended the
conference and referring to it in his autobiography wrote, "I did not
feel at all that our foreign policy was to be changed."
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As a defendant

at the IMT, Raeder, and others, must have found disconcerting the pro
secution's charge that long-standing German policies to which they had
adhered were now held to be conspiracy to aggression and crimes against
peace.
At Nuremberg the prosecution had the task of determining which of
two opposing concepts commanded precedence:

the survival of the com

munity (geopolitics) or one's responsibility and duty to humanity.

The

IMT judged that the greater ethical obligation was to mankind rather
than to the nation.
but morality:

The arbiter of German policies was not geopolitics,

the innate moral feeling or inherent sense of right and

wrong held to characterize mankind.

Some authors have regarded Hitler's policies as novel and have
noted the opposition within the General Staff. See, for example, Gordon
Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-19^5 (Oxford: Clarendon
press, 1955) and Harold Deutsch, Hitler and his Generals: The Hidden
Crisis, January-June 1938 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1974).
OO
Erich Raeder, My Life, trans. Henry W. Dreve] (Annapolis, Maryland:
United States Naval Institute, 1960), p. 267.

CHAPTER III

CRITICISMS OF THE TRIALS

The International Military Tribunal con'/oned in November, 194^ with
certain pre-established policies that were derived from the London
Charter which the four major Allied Powers had drafted the previous
August.

As might have been expected, these policies and their imple

mentation occasioned, at the time and since, a good deal of criticism.
Some of the criticism has already been alluded to, especially the
charge that the Allies were only enforcing a "victors’ justice."

It

is not the purpose of this thesis to answer the critics of the Nuremberg
trials, nevertheless, a discussion of the criticisms is in order so that
the uniqueness of the Nuremberg judgment may be made comprehendable.
The historical setting for the trials was, of course, the period
immediately after the end of the most destructive war in history.

It is

necessary to remember this obvious point in order to understand the
alternatives available to the survivors of the war— victors and van
quished alike.

One alternative was for the former belligerents to do

nothing; that is, admit no wrong, draw up no indictments, have no trials,
assign no responsibility, make no determination of quilt, and impose no
punishments.

Another alternative was for the victors to select certain

leaders from among the defeated, charge them with responsibility for the
war, and summarily execute them— an option that had many precedents, and,
incidentally, many supporters.

The alternative adopted was to have the

in
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victors conduct a series o r open trials in which those accused of having
committed war crimes would be given the opportunity to defend themselves.
The Allies adopted the latter alternative in large measure because
they believed it incumbent upon them to explain, or at least recount,
the reasons for the war and the suffering it had caused.

The Allies

felt obliged— in the interests of history and for the sake of all man
kind— to identify those responsible for the war and its cost, bring
them before the bar of justice, and punish those found guilty.

It was

this very procedure, however, that opened the IMT to criticisms, not the
least of which was the charge that the Allies had no authority over
Germans, no jurisdiction in Germany.
The IMT intended from the outset to prevent what might have been
construed as a miscarriage of justice after the First World War.

On

February 3, 1920 the Allied Powers submitted to the German Government
a list containing the names of 896 persons who were accused of having
committed war crimes.

The accused were to be handed over for trial

according to provisions of Article 228 of the Versailles Treaty.^
After German representatives at Versailles refused to accept the list,
and after the German Government made every effort to prevent surrendering
the persons charged with war crimes, the Allied Powers consented to
allow the Germans to conduct the trials themselves.

The Allies sub

sequently submitted to the Germans an "abridged" list containing the
names of forty-five persons to be tried before the Supreme Court at

"Woetzel, p. 30.
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Leipzig.

2

Of these forty-five individuals, twelve were tried by the

Leipzig court and six were convicted."*
5

Determined that those charged

with war crimes after the Second World War should not get off so lightly,
the Allies in 1945 conducted the trials themselves— even at the risk
of incurring opprobrium.

In the full knowledge that they could be

criticized for imposing a "victors' justice," the IMT prosecutors, never
theless, began their work.
Perhaps the most serious criticism of the IMT was that it imposed
ex post facto law.

The maxim nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine

lege provides that a person cannot be prosecuted for an act that was not
a crime at the time it was committed.

The nulla poena rule is basic to

the concept of civil liberty and has been incorporated into many con
stitutions, including that of the United States and Germany, and it is
4
also contained in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.
Be
cause conspiracy to wage aggression and crimes against peace had never
been declared to be crimes, to bring persons to trial for committing
these acts seems to fly in the face of the nulla poena rule.
the case, however.

Such is not

Robert K. Woetzel, an expert in international law,

offers a broader interpretation to the nullum crimen, nulla poena rule.
His interpretation, which was the one adopted by the IMT, was that:
In international law the maxim nulla crimen, nulla poena
has much the same significance as it does in common law

2 lbid., p. 32.
5Ibid., p. 34.
“‘ibid. , p. 112.
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countries rather than in those states which operate only Dy
statutory law, since international law develops more like
common law, i.e., from case to case on the customary as well
as judicial level, than like statutory law. It therefore,
cannot be considered a limitation upon the sovereignty of a
prosecuting state, but a general principle of justice. It is
intended to guard against abuses of justice through retro
active legislation. But if no injustice is worked, then
there is no violation of the principle.5

•o explain his definition of an injustice, Woetzel wrote that:
Whether or not an injustice is worked would depend on a
variety of circumstances: if the act was a heinous violation
of international law; if it was recognizable as sjch to the
individual: if he could reasonably be expected to know that
it was punishable; and if he intended to do the thing he did
which was in violation of his duties and obligations under
international law. If all these conditions are met in a
particular case, thta it would nor only be just to hold the
individual criminally responsible for his misdeed, it would
be an injustice not to do so. There could be no violation
of the maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena in such a case.^
Critics also charged the IMT with having violated the principle
of territoriality.

This principle, which is undergirded by the concept

* national sovereignty, declares that courts have jurisdiction only
wltnin the boundaries of the state in which the crime was committed.
Because the IMT was not a German court, because the prosecutors and
jucqes were not German, and because "■>ny of the alleged crimes were not
committed in Germany, some critics of the Nurembera Trials correctly
held ‘.he proceedings and judgements to be attacks on the sovereignty of
the German nation.

National sovereignty became, like nulla poeno, part

of the price paid to reach that elusive goal:
is : icht.

Ibid.
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the determination of what

!>h

The principle of acts of state is, like territoriality, connected
with sovereignty.

The idea behind this principle is that individuals

cannot be prosecuted for acts alleged to be crimes when committed in the
performance of their duties as agents of a sovereign nation.

The duty to

one's country, its constitution and its laws, has been held for centuries
to be the primary responsibility of such agents of the state as diplomats
who necessarily enjoy diplomatic immunity.

In the case of the defendants

at Nuremberg, however, immunity for acts performed in an official capacity
was not so certain.

The issue was made the more complex because each

officer had taken a personal oath of allegiance to Hitler and could
thus argue that he was obeying superior orders when carrying out his
duties.
Necessity of obeying superior orders which was used by the defense
at Nuremberg, is, in some ways, akin to the acts of state principle.

The

field manuals of all armies emphasize the importance of obedience to
orders.

Many critics, especially senior military officers, regarded the

decision of the 1MT to disallow this defense as potentially undermining
the authority on which all armed services are built, and hence, ulti
mately detrimental to an effective national defense.

Nevertheless, the

IMT ruled at the outset that defendants could not absolve themselves from
assuming the responsibility for the crimes with which they were charged
bv arguing that they were obeying orders from their superiors.

The IMT

did decide, however, that the argument miqht be used in mitigation when
sentences were pronounced.
For many reasons, therefore, those criticizing the legality of the
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IMT contend that the law created at Nuremberg was flawed from the outset
by being arbitrary and expedient.

The extremely tenuous and convenient

construction of the nullum crimen, nulla poena rule, and others, was
regarded as manifesting the victors' desire fur vengeance even at the
cost of denying ancient and fundamental xegal safeguards.

The justi

fications, rationalizations, and interpretations offered by Jackson,
Woetzel, and others in defense of the IMT appear to critics as mere
excuses, and poor ones at that, for the winners claiming their right to
judge the losers.

Legal expediency allied itself with political reality

and, in the process, thereby weakened the rights of the accused; this in
turn conflicted with the lioeral trend in Anglo-American law.

Such was

the essence of the legal positivist criticism of the Nuremberg Trials.
Another criticism of the Trials came from what may be called the
empirical school of international politics.

This view held that there

really is no such thing as international law and that the behavior of
nation-states throughout history should be the only real judge of the
concept of "crimes against peace."
this view is Montgomery Belgion.

One of the principal spokesmen for
In his book Victor's Justice, Belgion

made the following observation regarding German aggression and the IJr 3
of the sanctity of treaties:
You may tell me that, whatever the force of the objections
there were to preferring against the former German leaders
a charge of responsibility for "aggression," at least it is
indisputable that Germany went to war. not. once, but repeat
edly, "in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances." Certainly, the indictment enumerated twenty-six
treaties or agreements which the German Government was al
leged to have violated. However that may have been, it. is
not worth looking into. For although the sanctity of
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treaties has been a convenient shibboleth whereby war-time
propaganda identifies the corrupt nature of an enemy, the
respect or repudiation of an international treaty at any
particular time has always depended on circumstances, and
the interpretation of the circumstances is one more matter
of opinion. It is simply not true that a state has the ob
ligation to respect an international treaty to which it has
subscribed if subsequent events lead the government of that
state to believe that the provisions of the treaty have be
come inapplicable.7
Belgion's view of moral relativism in international relations is
the traditional sanctuary of the Realpolitician.

Belgion found it par

ticularly ironic that the Soviet Union was represented on the prose
cution despite Russian aggression against Poland, Finland, and the
Baltic States in 1939 and 1940.

He regarded this as most hypocritical

in view of the IMT's mandate to judge aggression and crimes against
peace.

This political-empiricist criticism of the Trials was the most

difficult to counter because it had deep historical roots.

Also, the

subsequent behavior of nations, on which Jackson and the IMT placed
much hope, appears to have rejected the verdict of Nuremberg and vin
dicated the political relativists.
Another criticism of the Trials stems from the attempt to put
teeth into the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

Justice Jackson's plea that the

Tribunal impose sanctions on individuals in accordance with the mean
ing of the Treaty involved an inherent contradiction.

The Treaty was

an agreement among nations, not neoDles, that they would renounce ag
gressive war.

It did not specify individual responsibiJity for vio

lations, ncr did the authors and signatories of the Pact anticipate

^Montgomery Belgion, Victors' .Justice (Hinsdale, II].:
Peqnery Company, 1949), p. 32.
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or desire that individuals should be held accountable for violations.
Thus, the anomaly of applying what was meant to be an ethical compact
among nations to the actions of real people occurred at Nuremberg.
The only satisfactory defense to this criticism was cot effectively
employed at Nuremberg.

That Defense resides in the very definition of

natural law.
Historiographic interpretation provides yet another criticism of
the Trials.

Werner Maser, a recent German scholar of the Trials, cong
tends that history cannot yet give "a final verdict" on them.
If [he writes], for instance, history starts from the prem
ise that Nuremberg was an instrument of Allied foreign pol
icy— which is easily demonstrable— then its purely legal
aspect and claim to legality inevitably appear as distortions.
If history accepts that the IMT represented a revolutionary
development in international law— which it was— it must also
accept that objection to the ex post facto application of
the Nuremberg principles, though hallowed by tradition, is
an obsolete one and that this historic event cannot be
judged from the viewpoint of conventional law. If it accepts
the IMT's claims and its legal basis as valid in inter
national law in the sense postulated by the IMT in 1945/6,
it cannot avoid recognizing the sentence on, for instance,
Donitz and Jodi as justified. If, however, history judges
these sentences in the light of the crimes committed, both
under international and criminal law, by the former Allies
between 1939 and 1945 and even more later (in Korea and
Vietnam for instance), it cannot do other than characterize
those sentences as an illegal act (of vengeance). Finally,
if history accepts occasional utterances by both the pro
secutors arid members of the Tribunal, it must inevitably
accuse the IMT of misusing tjpe legal process for the fur
therance of political power.
These historiographic options are not all-inclusive of the entire
Q
Werner Maser, Nuremberg. A Nation on Trial, trans. Richard Barry
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979), o. 280.
"Ibid., pp. 280-81.
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spectrum of possible interpretations.

The meaning of Nuremberg as

viewed from the perspective of natural law, for example, is not repre
sented.

Yet, they are indicative of the awesome task confronting any

one wishing to explain or justify the Trials in terms of the inherent
sense of right and wrong held to characterize mankind.

CHAPTER xV

THE CASE OF GENERAL ALFRED JODL
The prosecution at the IMT found it difficult to determine which
of Germany's leaders were to be held accountable for the crimes alledgedly committeo during the war.

Likewise, the determination of which

one, cr what combination, of the four counts in the indictment would be
charged against each defendant was also a vexing problem.

Some indi

viduals, Hermann Goering for example, because of their position in Nazi
Germany were obvious candidates to be prosecuted.

The culpability of

other individuals, however, was not so clear, and the charges against
them therefore reguired more documentation and testimony if they were
to L° proved guilty.

Some men in this latter group of defendants be

lieved themselves to be completely innocent of all counts.

Moreover,

legal, political, and military experts in the United States and England,
as well as Germany, were either dubious about whether these men were
guilty or opposed to their being prosecuted.

This chapter will examine

the case of one of these defendants, General Alfred Jodi, in order to
discuss the fundamental dichotomy between the traditional understanding
of law, ethics, and values of a German General Staff Officer and the
natural law applied at Nuremberg.
1

Alfred Joal was in many ways a gifted individual."

He was born in

Bavaria in 1890 and followed the family tradition of becoming an army

"‘‘Maser, p. 242. Jodi's I.Q. was considerably above average as
measured by American psychologists at Nuremberg.
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officer.

2

He held various staff appointments during the inter-war years

including being attached to the staff of President von Hindenburg.
During the period 1935-38 Jodi was chief of the armed forces war plans
department.

His competence in this capacity was recognized by the

General Staff so that in the event of war Jodi had orders to assume the
position of Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff (OKW).

Thus, in

late August, 1939 Jodi was called to Berlin and installed in that office.
His tenure in that position lasted throughtout the war and culminated
in his signing the surrender document in May, 1945.

As Chief of Oper

ations for nearly six years Jodi had a unique strategic perspective
during the war.

The prosecution at the IMT also determined that he had

a unique responsibility for the crimes charged— Jodi was indicted on all
four counts.
During his six days of testimony before the IMT Jodi made many im
portant revelations that shed much light on the strategic decision-making
process in wartime Germany.

Jodi also clarified the Officer Corps' per

ception of Hitler and the values that the officers held most dear.
Finally, jodl, in desiring to defend the honor of German soldiers and of
Germany itself, defined the primacy of national loyalty in the German
consciousness.
The charge of conspiracy to commit aggression, the first count of
the indictment, was leveled against Jodi for his part in planning the
remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Anschluss, and the proposed2

2IMT, XV:284. JodJ was a product of the German, formerly Prussian,
army tradition. His great-grandfather, ‘ather. uncle, brother, and
father-in-law were a.l.l officers.
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invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938 (Case Green).

Jodi, as chief of war

nlans and member of the Reich Defense Committee during that period, was
alleged to be a principal conspirator in those events.

In his defense

Jodi maintained that he was merely drafting military orders to implement
political decisions made by the government (Hitler).

He personally re

garded these policies as justified but had no real, or political, respon
sibility for their origin.

He made frequent mention of his, and the

Army's in general, non-involvement in the political decision-making
process and regarded political decisions as beyond his duty as a sol
dier.

Jodi considered the Rhineland operation and Case Green as de

fensive operations designed to protect Germany in case of attack by
combined French and Czech forces.

The situation of the occupation of

Austria was altogether different.

It was not only peaceful, but over

whelmingly vindicated by a subsequent plebiscite.

Jodi even suggested

to the Army operations department that bands should march "at the head
of the columns and that all drivers should be sure to wear goggles,
■7
otherwise they might be blinded by the flowers thrown at them.""'
The German Army's campaigns from 1939 on ceased to be campaigns
of flowers, however.

General Jodi was indictea at the IMT on the count

of crimes against peace for his part in the invasions of Poland, Norway,
Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Yugoslavia. Greece, and the Soviet Union.
The General was asked by his defense attorney to describe his job as
Chief of the Armed forces Operations Staff.

3 t bic. . p. ;7C6

Jodi replied as follows:

A2

It was the same as in any other military staff. The com
mander-: r.-chief— in this case the Fuhrer personally— received
data for rhe decisions to be made: maps, strength returns of
both our own and enemy forces, and information about the en
emy. He then made his own decisions, and thereupon I would
set my general staff to work, giving these decisions the
military form necessary for the entire machinery nf the
Wehrmacht.
Jodi's position was, therefore, comparable to that of General
George Marshall in the United States Army who was guoted by Jodi's de
fense attorney.

According to Marshall, "the world does not seriously

consider the wishes of the weak," and "above all we must . . . correct
the tragic misunderstanding that a security policy is a war policy . . . "

5

Jodi's attorney wished to make the point that the very

nature of the office of Chief of Staff reguires realistic planning for
war.

It is not a matter of which man is in the responsible position,

but rather part of the job description itself that determines military
planning during wartime.

In the case of Germany that planning was

complicated by the exigencies of geography.
Geography also determined the countries that Germany Invaded, ac
cording to Jodi.

Military necessity dictated the "preventive" attacks

on Norway, Belgium, and the Soviet Union in particular.

The General

contended that Germany was in possession of ample evidence to prove
that England and France would not have respected the neutrality of
Belgium ana that Germany's pre-emptive attack was tcerefore prudent

‘Ibid., d p . 370—71.
■’ibid., p. 3f>0.
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from a military standpoint.

Jodi also contended that England was at

the point of occupying Norway when Germany invaded,

insisted the

General,
. . . I neither attacked Norwegians, nor did I resort to
lies or excuses. But I did use all my strength to contri
bute to the success of an operation which T considered abso
lutely necessary in order to forestall a similar action on
the part of the English. If the seals of the archives are
ever broken, the rightness of my attitude will then be
clearly shown.
Jodi justified the invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941
as a war in self-defense— a "preventive" war.

He admitted that

Germany's need for Lebensraum "and the utilization of Russian economy
for Germany's needs did play a certain part, but it was not the basic
reason for the attack on the Soviet Union."'7

The main reason for at

tacking the Soviet Union, asserted Jodi, was that it was his and
Hitler's informed opinion that "we were under a dire threat of being ato
tacked by Russia. That was the decisive point."
Thus the largest and
the smallest of Germany's wars of aggression were justified as oper
ational necessities— wars in self-defense.
Jodi's skills and accomplishments were in the sphere of opera
tions.

He was also, however, an expert in the military asper:s of

international law and among his responsibilities was the reconciling of
German operations with international law.
Convention as we 11 as

6 Ibid.. P- 379.
7]bid.. p. 34 3.
”Ibid.. [i. 34 ■:.

He kept a copy of the Geneva
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his desk throughout the war.

But as an administrator whose job it was

to implement policy, Jodi recognized practical limits to international
law during wartime.

"As one conversant with the history of warfare,"

he said, "I knev- that there has never yet been in this world a war in
o
which infractions of international law did not occur."
On the other hand, Jodi had taken it upon himself during the war
to circumvent Hitler's orders when they were in clear violation of
international law.

Jodi was charged with war crimes for his part in is

suing orders regarding the execution of prisoners.

Jodi had become con

vinced by early 1944, however, that "the Fuhrer no longer concerned
himself with the idea of human rights," and from that time on he "re
solved not to tolerate and not to participate in any such violations
of international law on our part."'*'0

He then issued an order without

Hitler's approval that countermanded all existing orders regarding
execution of prisoners.
Jodi was convinced that the evidence, the documents, his war
diary, and copies of his orders would exonerate him of guilt for any
war crimes.

When asked by his attorney whether he had had opportunity

to destroy those documents Jodi replied:
Yes, between 3 May and 23 May [1945] I had time and leisure
to burn every piece of papei, but I gave instructions to my
staff not to destroy a single file, for I felt 1 had nothing
to conceal. I handed the complete files, and above all the
especially important ones, all the original Fuhrer directives
since 1940, to the American officer when i was captured.1’
Q
"Ibid., P- 34 J
10ibid., D. 336
11 Ibid., 0. 34 5
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General Jodi also believed that the record of his activities during the
war would not damage his character or reputation.

When asked during

cross-examination if he regarded himself as an honorable soldier, Jodi
replied, "With full consciousness, yes."

He was then asked if his

activities during the past seven years had soiled his honor.

"My

honor," he replied, "was certainly not soiled, for I guarded it per
sonally."'*''5

The prosecutor finally asked Jodi if in light of the docu

ments presented he still considered himself an honorable soldier and a
truthful man.

The General responded, "Not only do I still affirm that,

but I also think that the submission of these documents has actually
and quite specifically proved i t . " ^

This revealing dialogue between

Jodi and the prosecutor underlined the difficulty in communication be
tween those who regarded loyalty to their nation as the highest good
and the group who hold that an inherent sense of right and wrong characteiizes mankind.
And it was this difficulty in communication and gap in under
standing that posed such a problem for the IMT.

The prosecution and the

Tribunal held one view of the meaning of the Hitler phenomenon, while
men like Jodi held to an entirely different view.
his relationship with Hitler:

Jodi spoke thus of

"My influence on the Fuhrer was unfor

tunately not in the least as great as it might, or perhaps even ought

"^Ibid., p. 444.
■*"’lbid., p. 444.
^ I b i d . , d . 51 i.
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to have been in view of the position I held.

The reason lay in the pow1s
erful personality of this despot who never suffered advisors gladly."'
Jodi was, like the other defendants at the IMT and the Germans them
selves, still held by the Hitler mystique.

Nearly fourteen months

after Hitler's death Jodi never referred to him by name, but always as
"the Fuhrer."

And, said Jodi, when Hitler came to power, he was

"borne up by the love of the German people.
periences in that respect.

I had tremendous ex

He was almost overwhelmed by this love of

the people anc uf the soldiers."^6
Jodi, as an intelligent and patriotic German, recognized what
Hitler meant to Germany and realized how much he was loved by the
German people.

Jodi's defense, as that of the other defendants at

Nuremberg, was more bound up with an intense personal loyalty and
obedience to the leader of the Volk than with a loyalty to a form of
government or a geographical entity.

The oath of personal loyalty and

obedience to Hitler involved the doctrine of superior orders, which was
the ultimate defense of those being tried at Nuremberg.

Jodi formulated

the doctrine in conventional form for the IMT:
As for the ethical code of my action, I must say that it
was obedience— for obedience is really the ethical basis of
the military profession. That I was far from extending thr:
code of obe'ience to the blind code of obedience imposed on
the slave has, I consider, been proved beyond all manner of
doubt by my previous testimony. Nevertheless. you cannot
.ionaj matte
get around the fact that, espec;air

°Ib:id., p. 375.
16

Ibid., n. 509.
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of this particular kind [war plans], there can be no other
course for the soldier but obedience. 7
Obedience to superior orders as a defense was disallowed under
Article 8 of the IMT Charter, but the defense could be used in mitigation
when sentences were pronounced.

In the case of General Jodi, however,

the IMT ruled that:
There is nothing in mitigation. Participation in such
crimes as these has never been required of any soldier and
he cannot now shield himself behind a mythical requirement
of soldierly obedience at all costs as his excuse for com
mission of these crimes. 8
19
Jodi was found guilty on all four counts.
The IMT's finding that Jodi was guilty involved a new interpre
tation of law that has been criticized by Werner Maser.

"As a result

of its revolutionary concept of law," wrote Maser, "the IMT refused to
recognize or take legal cognizance of Hitler's overriding position of
authority, unparalleled in modern times and exploited by him In a manner all his own."

on

According to Maser, the IMT "held the defendants

personally and directly responsible under international law for actions
taken on orders."

21

Alfred Jodi himself never shirked this responsibility.

In his

final statement to the IMT the General eloquently delivered his apologits
17... .
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for his actions during the war:
Mr. President, may it please the Triounal, it is my urn
s' •'■'able belief that later historians will arrive at a just
and oo0 at W e verdict concerning the higher military lead
ers and their assistants, for they, and the entire German
Wehrmacht with them, were confronted with an insoluble task,
namely, to conduct a war which they had not wanted under a
commander-in-chief whose confidence they did not possess and
whom they themselves only trusted within limits; with meth
ods which frequently were in contradiction to their princi
ples of leadership and their traditional, proved opinions;
with troops and police forces which did not come under their
full command; and with an intelligence service which in part
was working for the enemy. And all this in the complete and
clear realization that this war would decide the life or
death of our beloved fatherland. They did not serve the
powers of Hell and they did not serve a criminal, but rath
er their people and their fatherland.
As far as I am concerned, I believe that no man can do
more than to try to reach the highest of the goals which
appear attainable to him. That and nothing else has always
been the guiding principle for many actions, and for that
reason, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, no matter what verdict
you may pass upon me, I shall leave this courtroom with my
head held as high as when I entered it many months ago.
But whoever calls me a traitor to the honorable tradition
of the German Army, or whoever asserts that I remained at my
post for personal and egotistical reasons, him I shall cal]
a traitor to the truth. In a war such as this, in which
hundreds of thousands of women and children were annihilated
by layers of bombs or killed by low-flying aircraft, and in
which partisans used every— yes, every single means of vio
lence which seemed expedient, harsh measures, even though
they may appear questionable from the standooint of inter
national law, are not a crime in morality or in conscience.
for 1 believe and avow that a man's duty toward his peopir
and fatherland stands above every other. To carry out this
duty was for me an honor, ana the highest law.
May this duty be supplanted in some happiej;..,future by an
even higher one, by the duty toward humanity.'"'
22 1M1
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Jodi's remarks were both poignant and prophetic.
at Nurembern uecause he did his duty,

He was convict,

fulfillment of his highest ob

ligation, loyalty to his country, thus became his nemesis.

When weigh

by the scales of natural law, that is one's duty toward humanity, Jodi,
was found wanting.

The judgment of Nuremberg was that duty toward

humanity is based on the innate moral feeling or inherent sense of
right and wrong held to characterize mankind.

CHAPTER V

THE NUREMBERG JUDGMENT AND THE GERMAN QUESTION

The judgment of Nuremberg directly addressed the dualism of
which General Jodi had spoken in his closing remarks to the IMT:

"a

man's duty toward his people and fatherland" transcends his "duty
toward humanity."

The judgment therefore went to the very heart of

the German "question."

The course of the trials, the determination

of the judgment, indeed the very fact that the trials were held— all
reflect a keen desire to arrive at an answer to that question.

Be

cause it was such a complex issue and because positivist law had never
had to grapple with such an admixture of philosophy, Realpolitik, myth,
and psychology, the judgment became an ambiguity.

To clarify the

ambiguity, to find the meaning of Nuremberg, one must use natural law.
Of all the nationalities represented at the IMT, it was the
Americans who found it easiest to view the proceedings in terms of
natural law.

The evocation of natural law became proper and logical

for citizens of a country whose national documents speak of "unalien
able rights" and truths which are held to be "self-evident."

The

rhetoric of natural law abounds throughout American history.

The

speeches and writings of Presidents Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wilson
make frequent mention of innate morality and the inherent sense of
rign*- and wrong.

Robert Jackson's opening and closing addresses to

the IMT are also couched .in the rhetoric of natural law.

At the
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conclusion of the IMT, Jackson sent a final report to President Harry
S. Truman (see Appendix) that summarized the trial.

The report con

cluded with the affirmation that "The trial and decision by which the
four nations [Allies] have forfeited the lives of some of the most
powerful political and military leaders of Germany because they have
violated fundamental International Law do more than anything in our
time to give to International Law what Woodrow Wilson described as
'the kind of vitality it can only have if it is a real expression of
our moral judgment.'"
The American view was predominant during the course of the trials.
That view was most insistent on upholding the primacy of the charges of
conspiracy to commit aggression and crimes against peace.

It was most

zealous in seeing to it that the vast quantity of documents obtained
should be open to the inspection of world opinion.

In fact, Jackson

regarded the documentation during the trial as an accomplishment of
great historical importance (see point 5 in Appendix).

The American

view manifested itself through the liberal use of the rhetoric of
natural law during the trials.

The judgment of Nuremberg was the

judgment of America.
After the conclusion of the IMT, the United States conducted the
Nuremberg Military Tribunals; it was the only nation to do so.

Genera]

Telford Taylor opened the prosecution's case in the "High Command Case"
of these trials by using language very similar to that used by Justice
JacKson twenty-seven months before.

After noting that Nuremberg had

been a battlefield in the Thirty Years' War, Taylor continued:
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These 30 years left much of Germany devastated, and dis
located its economy for decaues. But all that misery was the
merest trifle compared to the havoc recently wrought in six
short years, throughout Europe and the Orient.
The comparison between 1648 and 1948 is not original, and
few will openly dispute its cogency. Men at war have ceased
to toy with popguns and have taken to hurling thunderbolts,
and civilization can no longer afford such self-mutilation.
It was the acute awareness of these truths, forced upon us
by the First World War, which has led to the general con
demnation of those who wilfully launch a war of conquest as
criminals in the deepest and most serious sense.
These proceedings at Nuremberg, in which crimes against
peace are charged, are vitally important because the principles
to be applied here are man's best protection against his own
capacity for self-destruction. When we say that aggressive
war is a crime, we mean it to exactly the extent to which we
are prepared to treat it as criminal in a judicial proceeding.
No principle deserves to be called such unless men are willing
to stake their conscience on its enforcement.
Manifest again in this address is the innate moral feeling or inherent
sense of right and wrong held to characterize mankind.
The predominantly American emphasis on the primacy of natural law
was supported on occasion by representatives from other nations.

Sir

Harley Shawcross, the British prosecutor during the IMT, made extensive
use of natural law tenets in his closing address before the Tribunal.
In a lengthy and well-reasoned defense of the legality of the KelloggBriand Pact, Shawcross examined the notion of the determination of
national self-defense:
Neither the Pact of Paris nor any other treaty was intended
to— or could— take away the right of self-defense. Nor did it
deprive its sionatories ofthe right to determine, in the first

Nuernberg Military T r i b u n a l s , *r i a l s of War c r i m in al s Before
tne Nuernberg Military Tribunals, 13 vois. (Washington. 0. C . : Govern
ment p rintino Office, 199]), X:6l.
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instance, whether there was danger in delay and whether
immediate action to defend themselves was imperative; and
that only is the meaning of the express proviso that each
State judges whether action in self-defense is necessary.
But that does not mean that the State thus acting is the
ultimate judge of the propriety and of the legality of its
conduct. It acts at its peril. Just as the individual
is answerable for the exercise of his common law right of
defense, so the State is answerable if it abuses its dis
cretion, if it transforms "self-defense" into an instrument
of conquest and lawlessness, if it twists the natural right
of self-defense into a weapon of predatory aggrandizement
and lust. The ultimate decision as to the lawfulness
action claimed to be taken in self-defense does not lie
with the State concerned, and for that reason, the right
of self-defense, whether expressly reserved or implied,
does not impair the capacity of a treaty to create legal
obligations against war.^
That, in the final analysis, was what the judgment of Nuremberg at
tempted to uphold:

legal obligations against war.

For obvious reasons, the Nuremberg Trials could not hold the German
people collectively responsible for defying legal obligations against
war.

It would have been impossible, for example, to bring tens of mil

lions of people to trial and to have done so would have given clear
impression that the Allies were wreaking vengeance on a defeated and
orostrate people.

Nevertheless, the German people were not entirely

innocent of the charges that there had been a "conspiracy to wage ag
gression" and that "crimes against peace" had been committed.

They and

their government had failed to distinguish right from wrong in the
invasions launched during the period from 1939 to 1945.
Before a judgment on the collective guilt of Germans can be renderec
however

.it is necessary to he reminded that not all Germans supported

Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression , Supplement A :90.

Hitler and the Nazi government.

There had been a resistance movement

during the war and it had dramatically culminated in the abortive Putsch
and attempt on Hitler's life on July 20, 1944.

During the proceedings of

the IMT, lawyers for both the prosecution and the defense used this at
tempt on Hitler's life by Count von Stauffenberg

and his colleagues to

their own ends.
Defense counsellors pointed to the many trials and executions of
those implicated in the plot as examples of how widely the resistance
movement reached and how important the conspiracy was considered to be
by the Nazi government.

The facts brought out by the prosecution, how

ever, suggest that the resistance movement within Germany was of minor
practical conseguence.

Although several Army officers were involved in

the plot, no commander of front-line units participated.

The centers

of power in Germany, both military and civilian, remained committed to
Hitler.

That the plot had nearly succeeded was more a testimony to the

courage and determination of Count von Stauffenberg than to any wide
spread opposition to the regime.

Indeed, a fairer assessment of the

support given by the German people to the Nazi regime can be gained by
studying the results oF the Allies' attempts after 1945 to "denazify"
Germany.

The fraqebogen, or questionnaires, distributed to 13,000,000

Germans in the United States zone of occupation alone identified
3,596,000 Nazis who could have been indicted and brought to trial to
answer for their deeds.

'Edwin Hartrich, The Fourth and Richest Reich (New York:
Publishing Co., Inc.. 1980), o.
.

Macmillan
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Despite instances of resistance to Hitler, therefore, it is fair to
conclude that the majority of Germans remained loyal to their Fuhrer
until the end of the war.
perverse.

This loyalty wasas uniquely German as it was

It was manifested in

the Officer Corps.

the oath of loyalty to Hitler taken by

And the unity that the loyalty fostered was lauded

by Admiral Doenitz in May,

1945 when he ordered the members of the

German armed forces to lay

down their arms.

In his farewell address to

the Officer Corps Doenitz paid tribute to this unity in the following
words:
The most important thing is that we must keep a zealous
watch over the greatest boon that has been given to us by
National Socialism— our unity. Despite to-day's complete
military breakdown, our people are unlike the Germany of
1918. They have not yet been split asunder. Whether we
want to create another form of National Socialism, or
whether we conform to the life imposed upon us by the
enemy, we should make sure that the unity given to us by ^
National Socialism is maintained under all circumstances.
The judgment of Nuremberg and the subsequent course of European his
tory have confirmed Doenitz's view that Germans had been united under
National Socialism.

Those guilty of crimes committed in the name of the

Nazi state were punished and Germany was divided after 1945 into at
least five separate entities:

Russian Germany, Polish Germany, East

Germany, West Germany, and Austria.
sixth division.

Berlin may well be regarded as a

The Allies had learned their lesson well in 1945.

They

recognized that Germany under Hitler had been physically and spiritually
unified and that a strong and united Germany was an inherently unsettling
force in Central Europe.

That Germany is still partitioned in 1984

suqaests, moreover, that the United States and most nations of Eurooe are

^Wheeler-Bennett, p

699.
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not prepared for another experience of German unity nor for another ex
pression of German nat1'jnalism as profound as that manifested under
Hitler's leadership.

Civilization, Justice Jackson pleaded, reauires

protection from German nationalism.

CONCLUSIONS

What did the judgment of Nuremberg really mean?
victor's justice?

Was it merely a

Did it only .-eaffirm the truth of the adage that

might makes right?

These and other guestions are the subject of the

debate that still continues over the Nuremberg Trials.

The answers to

the questions depend, as they ever have, on whether one is an idealist
or a realist, a visionary or a pragmatisf , an optimist or a cynic.

The

trials did occur, however, and verdicts were reached that reflected the
Allies' views after the war.

These verdicts underline the immense

difficulty of attributing the most destructive man-made cataclysm in
history to the responsibility of a few individuals.

The difficulty can

not be resolved to the satisfaction of man's conscience without recourse
to natural law:

an inherent sense of right and wrong that characterizes

mankind.
The critics of the Nuremberg trials have raised many objections to
the proceedings.

Those who question the legality of the trials, how

ever, miss the point when they concentrate on the technical infractions
of traditional law.

The political empiricists' criticism is much closer

to the mark when they argue that the behavior of nation-states con
tradicts the statement of universal morality made at Nuremberg.

The

vocabularies o' defense departments and war cabinets ‘he world over
replete with euphemisms fnr aggression:

" ;;

.>

:>.;<i m o : r s ions.' "nr

emptive strike’'," "preventive wars," and "war’- n» national liberation.”
Thus 'an the modern Lea lpol.lt lei an contend that the mean m o o' v n emue; u
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has been buried under the sand of political reality.

Nations are not—

and have never been— deterred by morality from going to war.

The Kel-

logg-Briand Pact, wh^ch has never been repealed, has also become meaning
less in the light of the numerous aggressive wars fought since 1945.
Vet this empirical criticism is nihilistic when it emphasizes what i_s
instead of what should be.
The message of Nuremberg was addressed to civilization.
simple message:

It was a

wars are immoral and can no longer be tolerated.

Es

pecially so because, in General Taylor's words, "men at war have ceased
to toy with popguns and have taken to hurling thunderbolts . . . "
In the context of natural law, the judgment of Nuremberg was a
statement.

It was a statement of hope that the future is capable cf

learning from the past.

It was a statement in the tradition of

American Secretary of State Frank Kellogg who, in 1928, succeeded in
getting international agreement nn a treaty renouncing civilization's
oldest scourge.

It was also a flawed statement.

it was a statement chat needed to be made:

But despite its flaws

aggressive war is immoral.

Time and again the prosecution reminded the Tribunal of man's moral
ooligation not to war on his neighbors.

Seme defendants, such as

General Jodi, did not regard that obligation as transcending national
interests.

The Tribunal, however, found them guilty, and when ore-

pouncing sentence declared that there was "nothing in mitigation."
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Concluding paragraphs of Robert H. Jackson's final report to
President Harry S. Truman, filed on October 7, 1946.
The vital question in which you and the country are interested
is whether the results of this trial justify this heavy expenditure
°f
While the sentences imposed upon individuals hold drama
tic interest, and while the acquittals, especially of Schacht and
Von Papen, are regrettable, the importance of this case is not mea
surable in terms of the personal fate of any of the defendants who
were to appraise its long-range effects. The only criterion of suc
cess presently applicable is the short-range test as to whether we
have done what we set out to do. This was outlined in my report to
you on June 7, 1945. By this standard we have succeeded.
The importance of the trial lies in the principles to which the
Four Powers became committed by the Agreement, by their participation
in the prosecution, and by the judgment rendered by the Tribunal.
What has been accomplished may be summarized as follows:
1. We negotiated and concluded an Agreement with the Four dom
inant powers of the earth, signed at London on August 8, 1945, which
for the first time made explicit and unambiguous what was theretofore,
as the Tribunal had declared, implicit in International Law, namely,
that to prepare, incite, or wage a war of aggression, or to conspire
with others to do sc, is a crime against international society, and that
to persecute, oppress, or do violence to individuals or minor
ities on political, racial, or religious grounds in connection with
such a war, or to exterminate, enslave, or deport civilian popula
tions, is an international crime, and that for the commission of such
crimes individuals are responsible. This Agreement also won the ad
herence of nineteen additional nations and represents the combined
judgments of the overwhelming majority of civilized people. It is a
basic charter in the International Law of the future.
2. We have also incorporated its principles into a judicial pre
cedent. "The power of the precedent," Mr. Justice Cardozo said, "is
the power of the beaten path." One of the chief obstacles to this
trial was the lack of a beaten path. A judgment such as has been
rendered shifts the power of the precedent to the support of these
rules of law
No one can hereafter deny or fail to know that the
principle on which Nazi leaders are adjudged to forfeit their lives
constitute lew— and law with a sanction.
3. The Agreement devised a workable procedure for the trial of
crimes which reconciled the basic conflicts in Anglo-American, french,
and Soviet procedures.
In matters o' procedure, leaal systems differ
more than in substantive law. But the Charter set on a few simple
rules which assured all of the elements of fair and full hearing.
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including counsel for the defense. Representatives of the Four Powers,
both on the Bench and at the Prosecutor's table, have had to carry out
that Agreement in day-to-day co-operation for more than a year. The
law is a contentious profession and a litigation offers countless oc
casions for differences even among lawyers who represent the same
clients and are trained in a single system of law. When we add the
diversities of interests that exist among our four nations, and the
differences in tradition, viewpoint, and language, it will be seen
that- our co-operation was beset with real difficulties. My colleagues,
representing the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, ex
emplified the best professional tradition of their countries and have
earned our gratitude for the patience, generosity, good will, and
professional ability which they brought to the task. It would be idle
to pretend that we have not had moments of difference and vexation, but
the steadfast purpose of all delegations, that this first international
trial should prove the possibility of successful international co
operation in use of the litigation process, always overcame transient
irritations.
4. In a world torn with hatreds and suspicions where passions are
stirred by the "frantic boast and foolish word," the Four Powers have
given the example of submitting their grievances against these men to
a dispassionate inquiry on legal evidence. The atmosphere of the
Tribunal never failed to make a strong and favorable impression or
visitors from all parts of the world because of its calmness anu the
patience and attentiveness of every Member and Alternate on the Tribunal.
The nations have given the example of leaving punishment of individuals
to the determination of independent judges, guided by principles of law,
after hearing all of the evidence for the defense as well as the pro
secution. It is not too much to hope that this example of full and fair
hearing, and tranquil and discriminating judgment will do something to
ward strengthening the process of justice in many countries.
5. We have documented from German sources the Nazi aggressions,
cersecutions, and atrocities with such authenticity and in such detail
that there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the future
and no tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders can arise among in
formed people. No history of this era can be entitled to authority
which fails to take into account the record of Nurnberg. While an
effort was made by Goring and others to portray themselves as "aiowing
patriots," their admitted crimes of violence and meanness, of greed and
graft, leave no ground for future admiration of their characters and
their fate leaves no incentive to emulation of their examples.
6. It has been well said that this trial is the world's first
nost morten examination of a totalitarian regime. !n this trial, the
Nazis themselves with Machiavellian shamelessness exposed their
methods of subverting people's liberties and establishing their dic
tatorship. The record is a merciless expose of the cruel and sordid
methods by which a militant minority seized power, suppressed
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opposition, set up secret political police and concentration camps.
They resorted to legal devises such as "protective custody," which
Goring frankly said meant the arrest of people not because they had
committed any crime but because of acts it was suspected they might
commit if left at liberty. They destroyed all judicial remedies for
the citizen and all protections against terrorism. The record dis
closes the early symptoms of dictatorship and shows that it is only
in its incipient stages that it can ue brought under control. And
the testimony records the German example that, the destruction of op
position produces eventual deterioration in the government that does
it. By progressive intolerance a dictatorship by its very nature
becomes so arbitrary that it cannot tolerate opposition, even when
it consists merely of the correction of misinformation or the com
munication to its highest officers of unwelcome intelligence. It
was really the recoil of the Nazi blows at liberty that destroyed
the Nazi regime. They struck down freedom of speech and press and
other freedoms which pass as ordinary civil rights with us so thor
oughly that not even its highest officers dared to warn the people
or the Fuhrer that they were taking the road to destruction. The
Nurnberg trial has put that handwriting on the wall for the oppressor
as well as the oppressed to read.
Of course, it would be extravagant to claim that agreements or
trials of this character can make aggressive war or persecution of
minorities impossible, just as it would be extravagant to claim that
our federal laws make federal crime impossible. But we cannot doubt
that they strengthen the bulwarks of peace and tolerance. The four
nations through their prosecutors and through their representatives
on the Tribunal, have enunciated standards of conduct which bring
new hope to men of good will and from which future statesmen will
not liahtly depart." These standards bv which the Germans have been
condemned will become the condemnatin,i of any nation that is faith
less to them.
By the Agreement and this trial we h..ve put International Law
squarely on the side of peace as against aggressive warfare, ana on
the side of humanity as against persecution. In the oresent depressinc world outlook it is possible that the Nurnberg trial mav co^stitute the most important moral advanoe to crow out of this war.
The trial and decision by which the four nations have forfeited the
lives of some of the most Dowerf ui political and military leaders nf
Germany because they have ,'iolated fundamental Internationa] Law,
more than anything in our time to give to International Law whur
woodrow Wilson described as "the kind of vitality i*it can only have
if it is a real exoression of our moral judgment
I hereby resign my commission as your represent at. ivc and Chief
uunsei for the united states. lr; it-- <jvpct.ition i have had the
1m.iiv idun I i.y ,
of many able men and women,
m
• made on r son a 1 ‘ ■',r- ! 1'•u' *- •
•

‘

1
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earnestly believed.
I also want to express deep personal appreciation
for this opportunity to do what I believe to be a constructive work
for the peace of the world and for the better protection of persecuted
peoples. It was, perhaps, the greatest ever presented to an American
lawyer. In pursuit of it many mistakes have been made and many in
adequacies must be confessed. I am consoled by the fact that in pro
ceedings of this novelty, errors and missteps may also be instructive
to the future.
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